MIDDLE EAST CONTEMPORARY SURVEY

Volume XII

1988

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Westview Press
BOULDER, SAN FRANCISCO, & OXFORD

An Uneasy Truce in Islam

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For eight years, the Muslim world had been consumed by warfare on the frontier between Iran and Iraq, a conflict that had expanded into a contest between two rival visions of Islam. The war had poisoned the relations between the two great schools of Islam, Sunni and Shi'i, and had even violated the sacred space of Mecca. It had underlined the differences between Arab and Persian cultures, the two historical pillars of Islamic civilization. And the bloodshed had make a mockery of the supposed solidarity of Islam against the real and imagined injustices done by the West in Muslim lands. The Muslim world thus breathed a long sigh of relief in July, when Iran finally accepted a cease-fire and the shooting and missile-firing stopped. Internal reconciliation remained distant, but the Muslim world had stepped back from the abyss.

The advance of Iranian-style Islamic revolution was halted, perhaps even reversed. Now it was the turn of Sunni fundamentalism to boast of its power, drawing encouragement from successes in Afghanistan and Palestine. The failure of Islam to propel Iran to victory did not dampen their enthusiasm: Sunni fundamentalists had concluded several years earlier that no good could come to Islam from the Gulf War, and they had made no emotional investment in Iran's cause. Their growing influence along the rim of the Mediterranean pointed to a shift in the fulcrum of the struggle for Muslim primacy, away from the Gulf with its heavy Shi'i overtones, and into the traditional heartland of Islam.

THE PILGRIMAGE CONTROVERSY

For the first half of 1988, until the unexpected cease-fire, much of the world of Muslim activism remained preoccupied with the lingering effects of the Mecca incident of 31 July 1987. The deaths of several hundred Iranian pilgrims, most of them apparently shot by Saudi security authorities during a demonstration, had torn open sectarian scars that even the Iraqi-Iranian War had not touched. Holy places still retained their centrality in the psychological geography of believers, both Sunni and Shi'i, and the events in Mecca — birthplace and cradle of the Islamic faith and polity — reached into Islam's very core. Even the Palestinian *intifada* did not displace the pilgrimage controversy from its place of primacy in the internal discourse of Islam. From the blood-stained ground of Mecca's streets, the pilgrimage controversy passed to printing presses, airwaves, and above all to conference halls throughout the Muslim world. (For the development of the pilgrimage controversy since Iran's revolution, see *MECS* 1981–82, pp. 284–88, 301–3; 1982–83, pp. 238, 249–51; 1983–84, pp. 175–77; 1984–85, pp. 161–64; 1986, pp. 149–51; 1987, pp. 172–74.)[1]

CONFERENCE AND COUNTERCONFERENCE

As 1987 drew to a close, both Saudi Arabia and Iran had hosted rival Islamic conferences, in Mecca and Tehran, that brought the sectarian tension within Islam to a breaking point (see *MECS* 1987, pp. 174–76). The two antagonistic states — and much of Sunni and Shi'i Islam — had ended the year denouncing one another in high-pitched monologues, first over the pilgrimage, later over the very admissibility of the other's Islam.

From the midst of this venomous debate there emerged the idea of bringing Sunnis and Shi'is, Saudis and Iranians, together at a conference table to promote a cooling of sectarian tempers. The initiative belonged to the London-based World Islamic Council, under the directorship of Salim 'Azzam. A certain ambiguity surrounded the political orientation of 'Azzam. A naturalized Saudi and former Saudi diplomat, he had nonetheless attempted to build a reputation as an independent figure concerned with reconciling Islam from within. In recent years, his organization had sponsored widely international gatherings of Muslim activists on neutral ground in Europe, Asia, and Africa. (For past conferences, see *MECS* 1983–84, p. 174; 1986, p. 146; 1987, pp. 160–61.) The council was associated with Ahmad Ben Bella, former Algerian president, now Islamic activist, whose Lausanne apartment had become a meeting ground for Shi'is and Sunnis. 'Azzam now tried his mediating hand once again, sponsoring an "Islamic Unity Conference" that met in Islamabad from 16–17 February.[2]

Saudi King Fahd sent 'Abdallah 'Abd al-Muhsin al-Turki, director of the Imam Muhammad Ibn Sa'ud Islamic University in Riyadh, as his personal representative, along with a message that made a plea for sectarian reconciliation and "rational behavior" on the part of Iran.[3] Iran sent a delegation led by Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, head of the Islamic Propagation Organization in Tehran. Also in attendance was Iran's foremost Sunni client, Shaykh Sa'id Sha'ban from Tripoli, Lebanon. Sha'ban himself had played the role of a go-between after the Mecca incident, trying to mediate between Saudis and Iranians (see *MECS* 1987, p. 170). Other participants included Muhammad Hamid Abu al-Nasr, the general guide of the Egyptian Muslim Brethren; 'Umar 'Abd al- Rahman, a leader of the Egyptian Jihad organization; 'Abd al-Rahman Khalifa, general supervisor of the Muslim Brethren in Jordan and the Gulf; Hasan al-Turabi, leader of Sudan's National Islamic Front; Qazi Ahmad Husayn, head of the Pakistani *Jama'ate Islami*; Necmettin Erbakan, leader of Turkey's National Salvation Party; 'Abd al-Fattah Muru, secretary-general of Tunisia's Islamic Tendency Movement; and Afghan resistance leaders Gulbuddin Hikmatyar and Yunis Khalis. (Ben Bella was prevented from attending by unspecified political circumstances, but sent a lengthy message to the conference.) This constituted an impressive array of Sunni Muslim activists, mostly identified with the Muslim Brethren, who now tried their hand at reconciliation.

But the conference itself did not move Islam closer to inner peace. Sha'ban, a Sunni speaking in eloquent Arabic, took up his appointed role of arguing for Iran, and clashed with Turabi in a heated exchange over the Iraqi-Iranian War. This dialogue of the deaf produced a final statement that held Iraq responsible for starting the war, Iran for continuing it. The Saudis and a delegation of Iraqi-based Syrian Muslim Brethren lobbied against the first half of this resolution; Sha'ban, against the second. One pro-Iranian critic did not hesitate to declare the conference "part of the current

Saudi campaign against Iran."[4] Other pro-Iranian sources saw the conference as a victory for Iran, since Saudi Arabia had participated in a conference that clearly labeled Iraq the aggressor.[5] But like the war itself, the conference had no victor or vanquished. It represented but one more rhetorical skirmish in the battle between two contradictory visions of Islam.

In this battle, Iran was decidedly on the defensive. This became evident again during the sixth Conference on Islamic Thought, which met from 1–4 February in Tehran. The gathering, always held around the anniversary of the revolution, brought together more than 450 persons from 18 countries. But this year the event received less attention in Iran, because the Mecca incident had worked to confine the gathering to Iran's Shi'i clientele. The conference, devoted to the theme of human rights in Islam, was addressed by Iran's speaker of the Majlis, Hujjat al-Islam 'Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, and by Iranian President 'Ali Khameneh'i. As might be expected, the conferees denounced the West for applying a double standard of human rights, condemned the US and Iraq, blamed the Saudis for the Mecca killings, and called for the internationalization of Mecca and Medina.[6] The same resolutions were adopted in a score of pilgrimage conferences convened by Iran's supporters around the world.[7]

Saudi Arabia responded in kind. In Saudi eyes, the Mecca incident of 1987 had the effect of lining up much of Sunni Islam behind Saudi interpretations of the pilgrimage, if not of Islam itself. Saudi Arabia continued its efforts to build popular support among its many foreign friends and clients in the world of Muslim activism. As in the past, the burden fell largely upon the Mecca-based Muslim World League (MWL; *rabitat al-'alam al-Islami*; on the MWL, see *MECS* 1981–82, pp. 295–97; 1982–83, pp. 246–47; 1983–84, pp. 165–66; 1984–85, p. 149; 1986, pp. 132–33; 1987, p. 158).[8] The MWL had organized a large conference in Mecca in October 1987, gathering MWL-supported Muslim activists who issued an unequivocal condemnation of Iran for its supposed responsibility for the Mecca tragedy (see *MECS* 1987, pp. 174–75). It had also supported numerous local pilgrimage conferences held in the Muslim world and beyond. Now the MWL worked to organize yet another world conference that would reach the same conclusion, but do so under other authoritative Islamic auspices, on ostensibly neutral soil.

This idea evoked a positive response in Cairo from the Shaykh al-Azhar, Jadd al-Haqq 'Ali Jadd al-Haqq. In Egypt, too, adherents of revolutionary Islam refused to recognize the established authority of the state-directed institutions of Islam. As the sectarian divide opened wider, Egyptian security authorities increasingly sought to identify this Islamic opposition as "Khomeyniite," and so burden it with foreign, non-Arab, and Shi'i associations. Further arrests of members of a "Khomeyniite" group first broken up by security authorities during the previous year, kept alive the allegation that Iran was behind Islamic unrest in Egypt.[9] The leading Saudi and Egyptian authorities in Islam had long shared a common interest in countering Iran's vision of Islam. This shared interest blossomed into actual cooperation, with the convening in Cairo of the eleventh conference of al-Azhar's Academy of Islamic Research (*majma' al-buhuth al-Islamiyya*).[10] The conference, gathering 215 participants from 88 countries, met from 4–8 March.

The Cairo conference, formally devoted to questions of Islamic missionary activity (*da'wa*), actually served as yet another Sunni forum for the condemnation of Iran. It

represented, above all, the shared concerns of al-Azhar and the MWL, but also involved individual activists or official representatives from Morocco, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Sudan, the United Arab Emirates, and Jordan, and like-minded Islamic organizations, such as the Baghdad-based Popular Islamic Conference (on which, see *MECS* 1982–83, pp. 243–45; 1984–85, p. 151). In his opening address to the conference, Egyptian President Husni Mubarak set the tone of the gathering by asking rhetorically whether Iran's "aggression is an Islamic tide and its bloody action is a struggle for the sake of Islam."[11] The conference passed a resolution condemning the Iranian pilgrims and the Iranian regime for their alleged desecration of Mecca in 1987, and ruled that demonstrations and marches during the pilgrimage violated the sanctity of the holy cities. The resolutions called the Iranian-backed idea of the internationalization of Mecca "foreign to Islam," and offered full support for Saudi measures to preserve Mecca and Medina against any recurrence of the previous year's events.[12] These resolutions drew upon the learned lecture of Jadd al-Haqq, who buttressed his discussion of the pilgrimage with references to classical Islamic sources.[13]

In addition to these and other resolutions, the conference decided to establish a World Islamic Council for *Da'wa* and Aid (*al-majlis al-Islami al-'alami li'l-da'wa wa'-iqhatha*), which would coordinate the international activities of the Azhar, the MWL, the Popular Islamic Conference, and other Islamic missionary and aid societies. A September meeting set down a constitution for the new organization, chose Cairo as its permanent seat, and selected Kamil al-Sharif as secretary-general.[14] Although originally Egyptian, Sharif had spent many years in Jordan, where he had served as minister of religious endowments. A prominent supporter of the Muslim Brethren, he was known for his long-standing ties to Saudi Arabia and the MWL. Funds for the new organization were to come from donations from governments and the participating institutions. Twenty-five years earlier, the MWL and the Azhar had been bitter rivals: they had served as Islamic instruments wielded by their respective governments to discredit one another. A shared interest in discrediting Iran now brought them together in a close alliance. But it remained to be seen whether the new council would achieve coordination between two great centers of Sunni Islam that had a long history of rivalry, and still jealously guarded their independence.

THE CONSENSUS OF REGIMES

The Jidda-based Islamic Conference Organization (ICO), consisting of 45 states and the PLO, had functioned for two decades as a subtle instrument of Saudi influence in the Muslim world. (On the ICO, see *MECS* 1981–82, pp. 283–84, 298–301; 1982–83, pp. 235–37; 1983–84, pp. 158–65; 1984–85, pp. 146–48; 1986, pp. 127–30; 1987, pp. 153–58).[15] Saudi Arabia did not overtly manipulate this organization of Muslim states. But it exercised tremendous influence behind the scenes, through the financing and staffing of the ICO. Although the annual conferences of foreign ministers and the triennial summits were open forums for debate, the deck of the ICO was stacked heavily in favor of Saudi Arabia. For this reason, Khomeyni's Iran had often absented itself from ICO conferences, most recently from the Islamic summit held in Kuwait in January 1987. The ICO had been paralyzed for close to a decade by the Gulf War, becoming a comfortable forum for Saudi Arabia and Iraq, but utterly useless as an instrument of Muslim mediation.

Few surprises were anticipated from the 17th annual ICO conference of foreign

ministers, convened in Amman from 21–25 March. By this time, no one expected a breakthrough in the Gulf War as a result of ICO diplomacy. "To be realistic," said the conference chairman, Jordanian Foreign Minister Tahir al-Masri, "we have to acknowledge that continued Arab, Islamic, and international mediation efforts with Iran have failed and the war is spreading and increasing in intensity. To achieve reconciliation during this conference and at this level is doubtful."[16] Nor would the conference be able to do much more than reiterate past support of the Palestinian cause, and its manifestation in the form of the *intifada* taking place but a few kilometers from the conference setting. Although the ICO secretariat issued many appeals for Muslim solidarity with the Palestinians, member states had rejected the idea of an emergency ICO summit only the month before.[17]

The truly new issue on the agenda was the pilgrimage. Saudi Arabia had two principal aims at the conference. The first was to secure further condemnation of Iranian conduct during the pilgrimage, so as to allow the Saudi authorities to ban all demonstrations during the pilgrimage. The second was to win the conference's assent to a cutback in the number of pilgrims — a cutback so formulated as to bring about a drastic reduction in the number of Iranian pilgrims. Saudi Arabia had received support for its pilgrimage policy from Sunni Muslim activists and religious authorities; now it sought the seal of approval of Muslim governments.

But would Iran, a lapsed ICO member, put up a fight? Iran had no doubt that the ICO foreign ministers would reiterate their established position on the Gulf, calling upon Iran to accept a cease-fire in accord with UN Resolution 598. Had this been the only item affecting Iran on the agenda, Iran might have followed its usual custom of boycotting the proceedings. But Iran apparently did see some point in trying to influence the outcome of the first pilgrimage debate under ICO auspices. Iranian Foreign Minister 'Ali Akbar Velayati made his decision at the last possible moment, deciding only a few days before the conference that Iran would be represented — but by a foreign ministry official rather than himself.

At Amman, Saudi Arabia sought to give its policy the character of the express will of the world of Islam. The Saudi delegation did so by having Jordan submit a draft resolution on the sanctity of Mecca and Medina, which condemned Iran and supported Saudi pilgrimage measures.[18] In his speech, Jordanian Foreign Minister al-Masri attacked "the perverse, aggressive regime" of Iran for intervening in the affairs of other states, committing aggression against Iraq, dealing with Israel, allowing Iranian Jews to emigrate to Israel, and subverting the pilgrimage.[19] This relieved the Saudi delegate, Sa'ud al-Faysal, of the need to engage in similar polemics. When he did mount the podium, he cited the expressions of support by "states, bodies, organizations, and Islamic centers.... The list truly represents an Islamic unanimity which is beyond any doubt."[20] The Saudi delegation then put forward a memorandum regarding the pilgrimage, stating that in order to improve services to pilgrims, Saudi Arabia wished to limit their number, by instituting annual national quotas of 1,000 pilgrims per million population for a period of three years. Although this proposal made no explicit mention of Iran, its intent was transparent: Iranian pilgrims constituted the largest foreign delegation, and imposition of the proposed quota would mean the reduction of their annual numbers from 150,000 to 45,000. Iran sought to counter this move by presenting the findings of its own committee of inquiry

into the Mecca incident, and demanded the establishment of an ICO committee to investigate the tragedy.[21]

But the political committee overwhelmingly approved the Saudi-inspired resolutions, dealing a decisive defeat to Iran. The head of the Iranian delegation then announced his country's withdrawal from the conference, charging that "Saudi Arabian money spent at the conference has prompted the resolutions," and that the conference was "a great puppet show."[22] Iran's half-hearted participation in the conference had been to no avail. The final resolutions denounced "the riots and destruction perpetrated by the Iranian pilgrims," reiterated the Saudi "right to take any measures necessary to prevent a repetition of riots and anarchy," and supported the Saudi plan to reduce the number of of pilgrims.[23] At Amman, Saudi Arabia could rightly claim to have won yet another round in its continuing campaign against Iran.

This preoccupation with the pilgrimage stood in striking contrast to the neglect of other issues that fell within the ICO's purview. There were 87 items on the agenda of the conference, 34 on the agenda of the political committee. Most of these items had long figured in ICO agendas, and a consensus had been reached long ago about support for the PLO and a Palestinian state, support for the Afghan resistance, and the need for Iran to accept a cease-fire in the Gulf War. Once again, there were small skirmishes over these resolutions, but no change in their substance. Despite the *intifada*, ambiguities over the Palestine question abounded, as they always had. As in the past, the conference called upon all Muslim states having relations with Israel to sever them; yet it determined that the 19th foreign ministers' conference would be held in Cairo, thus placing the final seal on Egypt's rehabilitation within the ICO. (On Egypt's return to the ICO, see *MECS* 1983–84, pp. 160–62; 1984–85, 146–47; 1987, p. 155.) Syria protested this move, demanding to know how an ICO foreign ministers' conference could meet in a country where Israel's flag flew freely.[24] But Syria could do nothing to brake the continuing process of Egypt's reintegration — a process supported by the great majority of ICO member states, and driven to its ultimate conclusion by the choice of Cairo as a future conference site.

The ICO itself remained caught in a web of internal contradictions. Its great success story, the Islamic Development Bank (IDB), showed signs of fatigue in its fight against the Muslim world's deepening dependence on the West. Trade among ICO member states hovered at a mere 10% of their total imports and exports, and the prevailing trend was one of decline. The recession had led to a drop in IDB financing activities; the latest reported figure for 1986–87 showed $740m., down from $849m. the previous year. In some instances, subscriptions by member states to the IDB's working capital were far overdue.[25] Yet the IDB remained the most significant achievement of the ICO. Even Iran, which had not joined in the IDB in the Shah's days, and remained estranged from the ICO in the age of Khomeyni, finally applied for IDB membership in 1988.[26]

The ICO secretariat had become almost a parody of an international organization, consumed with its self-preservation, open to political manipulation, deep in deficit because of wasteful spending. Even the ICO's biggest Saudi backer, Foreign Minister Sa'ud al-Faysal, complained of the "inflation of administrative and financial spending" in the ICO, and declared that there was need for "rationalizing expenditures." He urged member states to meet their commitments to the ICO, and especially "to pay in full their decided quota."[27] The secretariat's budget for 1987–88 came to $7.6m., down

from $8m. the previous year; total unpaid debts of member states to the secretariat stood at $18.75m., as of June 1987.[28]

The Amman conference elected Niger Prime Minister Hamid Algabid as the ICO's new secretary-general, to replace the Pakistani Sharifuddin Pirzada. Algabid had been schooled in law and public administration in Abidjan and Paris, and had trained at the International Monetary Fund in Washington. He had served in numerous ministerial positions — commerce, transport, finance — and for four years had been Niger's prime minister, a position from which he resigned in order to take over Pirzada's post.[29] "When Pirzada took over from Habib Chatti [of Tunisia] four years ago, we thought that as an Asian he would be a better organizer," said an anonymous ICO official. "But unfortunately we were wrong. Very little has been achieved over the last four years."[30] Now the task fell to an African, in accord with the ICO practice of rotating the position among Arabs, Asians, and Africans.

But it was not the personality or geo-ethnic origins of the secretary-general that had crippled the ICO. The domination of Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies had cost the ICO its neutrality. "It is true rich Muslim countries have influence," said the Jordanian chairman of the Amman conference, "but they do not dominate."[31] But during the conference, Saudi Arabia had assured that influence by announcing donations to the Islamic Solidarity Fund ($6m.), the Jerusalem Fund ($2m.), and other ICO activities ($2m.).[32] Without Saudi support, the ICO would have collapsed long ago. Yet Saudi Arabia had exacted a political price for opening its purse, one so steep that it had cost the ICO much of its credibility. The ICO had failed to accomplish a reconciliation between two member states whose war had torn Islam apart, and later in the year, when both sides wished for neutral auspices to police their cease-fire, they turned to the UN. Only the healing of Islam's self-inflicted wounds could restore the ICO to the halcyon days it had known in the 1970s — and that healing was bound to be a slow one.

THE PILGRIMAGE OF 1988

Fortified by major Islamic conferences in Mecca and Cairo, and the resolutions of the ICO foreign ministers in Amman, the Saudis shifted their attention to the next pilgrimage. In Mecca and Cairo, the Saudis had been urged by the self-appointed authorities of Sunni Islam to ban all demonstrations and marches during the pilgrimage. In Amman, a majority of Muslim governments gave their consent to a cut in the number of pilgrims that would reduce the Iranian contingent by two thirds. The Saudi authorities now sought to translate these resolutions into a far-reaching revision of the informal understanding that had come apart in 1987, and which had become a thorn in the Saudi side. The Saudi Government sought to diminish the quantity and quality of the Iranian pilgrimage, by admitting only 45,000 Iranian pilgrims, and by banning the marches allowed in Mecca and Medina during previous years. Iran took the position that both these measures constituted Saudi neglect of its obligations toward Islam: the Saudis, claimed Iran, wished to prevent the great majority of Iranian Muslim pilgrims from arriving, and proposed to keep those who did arrive from fulfilling a fundamental part of the pilgrimage ritual.

The Saudis claimed that it was not their intention to exclude the Iranians;[33] even Khomeyni himself would be welcome.[34] But they were reasonably certain (and probably hopeful) that the new terms would provoke Iranian self-exclusion. Khomeyni

performed as expected by declaring it impossible for Iran's pilgrims to go on pilgrimage and not demonstrate against "world arrogance."[35] Although Syrian mediation made possible the dispatch of an Iranian delegation to Saudi Arabia in April to discuss the matter, the talks changed nothing. The Iranians insisted on the sending of a full contingent of 150,000 pilgrims, as well as the right to demonstrate in Mecca and Medina as in past years. If these demands were not met, the delegation warned, Iran would boycott the pilgrimage. But the Saudi authorities stood firm, citing what they called "the consensus of the Islamic nation." The three-year limitation on the number of pilgrims would remain in force, and if Iranians dared to demonstrate, Saudi Interior Minister Prince Na'if warned, they would be "quelled by force."[36] Khomeyni's pilgrimage supervisor, Hujjat al-Islam Mehdi Emami-Jamarani, was probably right in declaring that had Iran's pilgrims "acted like those who wish to be servile to the Saudi regime and performed an American-style *hajj,* they definitely would have agreed to receive 300,000 of our pilgrims."[37]

On the delegation's return to Iran, a new round of accusations began, yet Khomeyni did not issue an unequivocal announcement of a pilgrimage boycott. Saudi Arabia therefore took a decisive step by severing relations with Iran on 26 April. The timing of the move suggested a Saudi desire to eliminate the prospect of attendance in Mecca by any Iranian pilgrims, although the severing of relations was the subject of a lengthy internal Saudi debate that involved wider political considerations (see chapter on Saudi Arabia).[38] In Iran itself, arrangements for the sending of 150,000 pilgrims proceeded into June, but no preparations for accommodation and guides could be made in Mecca. Only when time ran out did Tehran decide to translate its stand into a formal boycott. Iran then claimed to have been excluded; Saudi Arabia claimed that Iran excluded itself.

The subsequent polemics reiterated the old charges of religious deviation. The Saudi Council of Ministers declared that the Iranians, by "causing havoc" during the pilgrimage, had "moved outside the Islamic consensus."[39] The Iranians accused the Saudis of preventing Muslims from fulfilling the fundamental obligation of pilgrimage. Any Muslim with the means to perform the pilgrimage was entitled to do so; the Saudi implementation of a quota system demonstrated their incompetence.[40] In Khomeyni's message marking the first anniversary of the "massacre," he accused the "centers of Wahhabism" of "sedition and espionage." At Mecca in 1987, "the sword of blasphemy and division, which had been hidden in the hypocritical cloak of Yazid's followers and descendants of the Umayyad dynasty, God's curse be upon them, had to come out again from the same cloak of Abu Sufyan's heirs to destroy and kill."[41] Whatever his intention, Khomeyni's resort to this historical analogy constituted a sectarian allusion — despite his claim, in the very same message, that it was the US and the Saudis who tried to portray the Mecca events as a sectarian clash.

Once it became clear that Iranian pilgrims would not arrive, rumors began to fly that Iran would insinuate its supporters among pilgrims from other countries, and particularly among the Shi'i pilgrims.[42] Counterrumors then charged that Saudi security forces had been beefed up by reinforcements from Egypt, Morocco, and Turkey.[43] During the pilgrimage, Iran claimed that demonstrations had indeed taken place in Mecca,[44] a claim denied by the Saudi authorities.[45] In fact, a number of Pakistani Shi'is launched a small demonstration in Mecca; they were arrested at the airport before leaving, and were only released following the intervention of the

Pakistani Government.[46] It would appear that the pilgrimage passed without serious incident, amidst the most stringent security measures ever implemented by the Saudi regime. On arrival, pilgrims from certain countries were subjected to rigorous searches and interrogation. "Are we nonbelievers that Saudi agents treat us like animals at the airport?" complained a Libyan pilgrim.[47] As a preventive measure, younger pilgrims were banned under some of the new quotas. For example, Lebanese pilgrims under the age of 40 were not issued visas. Combined with a sharp drop in the number of Lebanese visas (in line with the new quota system), Saudi Arabia succeeded in blocking the participation of large numbers of Iran's Lebanese Shi'i clients.[48]

The absence of Iranian pilgrims in 1988 brought an enforced truce to the pilgrimage, not a peace. But the surprise announcement by Iran of its willingness to accept a cease-fire in the Gulf — an announcement made in the very midst of the pilgrimage — held out the prospect of a reconciliation. Only a few days after the announcement, Saudi King Fahd told the heads of of pilgrimage delegations that he "regretted" the absence of Iranian pilgrims.[49] It was the first sign of a possible diminution in the sectarian tension generated by Islam's fratricidal war. With the cease-fire, the Muslim world took a first first tentative step toward internal reconciliation.

IRAN: REVOLUTION IN ONE COUNTRY?

On 18 July, Iran announced its unconditional acceptance of a cease-fire in its war with Iraq, in accord with UN Resolution 598. The impending end of the war had profound implications for the the region as a whole. For Iran, the war had represented a crusade of truth and a vindication of the revolution's message of Islam; but with Iran's growing military frustration, the war had become a bottomless pit of regrets. With the cease-fire, Iran admitted that it could not remake the Arab world in its own image. Yet over the years, Iran had built certain political assets in the Arab and wider Muslim world, under the rubric of "exporting the revolution." These were Muslim movements, mostly Shi'i, that owed a high degree of fealty to the Imam Khomeyni. Some of these assets had directly served the war effort, others provided Iran with a more general influence in the Muslim world. Now that Iran had conceded defeat in war, the wider Muslim world awaited with anticipation Iran's decision on whether to keep these foreign assets of the revolution, or trade them away for a normalization of relations with existing regimes. (This chapter discusses the implications of the cease-fire for Iran's relations with Muslim movements. For the development of these relations, see previous volumes of *MECS*. For the causes and wider repercussions of the cease-fire decision, see the chapters on the Iraqi-Iranian War, and inter-Arab affairs.)

This question remained tied up with the struggle over the control of foreign policy. Despite their differences, a concerted effort had been made by speaker of the Majlis 'Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and President 'Ali Khameneh'i to centralize foreign policy and entrust its execution to Foreign Minister 'Ali Akbar Velayati. Yet many other Iranian figures sought a hand in foreign affairs, and their disagreements surfaced again in 1988. Some of these figures thought that Rafsanjani and Khameneh'i had adopted too soft a line. This view was championed by Interior Minister 'Ali Akbar Mohtashemipur, former Iranian ambassador to Syria, who had a reputation for his fervent support of Muslim movements elsewhere. According to some sources,

he even controlled many of the funds sent to Hizballah in Lebanon.[50] In June he gave an interview in which he rejected a cease-fire in the the Gulf and called for more support of Lebanon's Hizballah.[51] This earned him a reprimand from Khomeyni, for venturing outside the jurisdiction of his own ministry. But Mohtashemipur's view had the sanction of Khomeyni's heir designate, Ayatollah Husayn 'Ali Montazeri, known for his devotion to the cause of Shi'ism beyond beyond Iran's frontiers.

Others thought Rafsanjani and Khameneh'i were too indulgent of the extremists. In September, Prime Minister Mir Husayn Musavi offered his resignation to Iranian President Khameneh'i, claiming that the government had lost much of its authority in foreign affairs. "Today, the affairs of Afghanistan, Iraq, and Lebanon are in your hands," he reportedly complained, lamenting that "external operations" had taken place without his knowledge:

> Only after an airplane is hijacked are we informed. Only when a machine gun opens fire in one of the streets of Lebanon and the sound of it echoes everywhere do we find out about the incident. Only after explosives are discovered in the possession of our pilgrims in Jidda [in 1986] do I find out about it. Unfortunately, and in spite of the damages and harm caused by these actions to the country, such operations can take place at any time, at any hour in the name of the government.[52]

The reference to hijacking evoked the April hijacking of a Kuwaiti airliner to Mashhad, in which two passengers were murdered (see chapter on Kuwait). No incident better demonstrated the continuing debate over whether Iran should approach other Muslim movements as a revolution or as a state. The hijackers, apparently Lebanese Shi'is, demanded the release of 17 Shi'i terrorists held by Kuwait, in a virtual replay of the hijacking of a Kuwaiti airliner to Tehran in December 1984 (see *MECS* 1984–85, pp. 154, 403–4). As in that earlier instance, there was considerable evidence for on-the-ground collaboration with the hijackers.[53] The Kuwaiti press went so far as to link the hijacking with Mohtashemipur and the Iraqi Shi'i exile group, the Islamic Action Organization.[54] Velayati, on the other hand, was deeply embarrassed and actually offered his sympathies to his Kuwaiti counterpart. A struggle went on behind the scenes in Iran over the extent of support to be offered to the hijackers — a struggle ultimately resolved by allowing the hijacked airliner to refuel and leave. The event served as a reminder that although many of the most powerful men in Iran sought to put terrorism behind them, the regime had raised up cadres of revolutionary zealots who still had influential friends in important Iranian ministries.

The cease-fire seemed to signal that the day of the undiscriminating zealot had passed. A month after the cease-fire announcement, Rafsanjani told the world that "if you believed that we wished to export the revolution by force, you were mistaken. Do not repeat this mistake in the future. We never thought that the revolution could be exported through force."[55] As one astute observer wrote, "after a decade of exhortations and passionate proselytism, and a war they could not conclude on their own terms, the governors of [Iran] must fully understand that their pan-Islamic revolution did not catch hold."[56] But there was no reason for Iran to throw away those gains that it had made during the turbulent decade of Shi'ism, especially in arenas away from the Gulf. What the cease-fire did mean was the beginning of a serious taking of Iran's stock in the Muslim world, and a reassessment of the tone of its

message. Shaykh Sha'ban, Iran's Sunni client from Lebanon, summarized the emerging approach. There were Muslim movements that found themselves in a situation like that faced by the Prophet Muhammad in Medina; but most faced a climate reminiscent of Mecca before its conquest. To such movements, Iran had to preach patience and guile, not revolution. "We do not say to a new Islamic movement that does not have the power to change the regime: 'Commit suicide by engaging the regime in battle.' Rather we say: 'Come in contact with other Islamic movements until the appointed day.'"[57] For those in Iran who wished to see other Muslims emulate their revolution, and for Iran's admirers in other lands, the cease-fire in the Gulf meant the distancing of the appointed day, even as they affirmed its inevitability. In one sense, the new position represented a return to the old ways of Shi'ism, of awaiting some distant redemption while enduring the oppression of the present.

THE SAUDI-IRANIAN VERBAL TRUCE

Following the cease-fire, Islam's sectarian war of words died down, amidst some sporadic verbal firing. A last shot was fired at the first ICO conference of ministers of information, which met in Jidda from 11–12 October. The Muslim world, so the ministers believed, had to preserve its foundations against "the subversive ideological invasion" that threatened to "belittle and cast doubt" on Islam. The Muslim media had to counter this threat, and the ministers agreed to establish a standing committee and meet in conference every two years. Iran did not attend the conference; Saudi King Fahd expressed his regret at Iran's absence, since the conference was "a conference of all Muslims, not a Saudi conference."[58] The conference also hailed the cease-fire in the Gulf. But the resolutions also opposed the "extremism and violence" that so damaged the image of Islam, determining that "the climax of this deviant course led to bloody aggression against God's holy mosque in Mecca" in 1987. The resolutions also called for a Gulf peace that would guarantee Iraq's sovereignty "over its territories and waters," a stand in clear accord with Iraq's position in peace negotiations.[59] Perhaps the highlight of the conference was King Fahd's repudiation that the Saudis were adherents of Wahhabism, a charge made by the Iranian media in order to evoke memories of the distant days when Wahhabism was regarded by Sunni Muslims as a deviation. "Wahhabism," said King Fahd, "does not exist."[60]

The resolutions provoked a heated Iranian denunciation of the conference, "which is backed by the Wahhabi regime of the Hijaz — a regime which is outside the bounds of Islam."[61] This response had special significance in light of King Fahd's denial of the distinct existence of Wahhabism.[62] Clearly Saudi Arabia, which had emerged victorious in the verbal war for Islam, would have to go farther if it were to reconcile Iran. King Fahd did so shortly after the information ministers' conference. Asked about the pilgrimage, Fahd declared that Iran

> is a Muslim state and its people are a Muslim people...difference in points of view does not mean that differences are permanent....As far as Iran is concerned, the problems will certainly end and they will be replaced by concord, friendship, and harmony. If we simply look at the problems between the Kingdom and Iran, we will find that they are minuscule.

Fahd then announced a suspension of the media war with Iran: "Let us start behaving in this way and we hope that we will be treated in the same way."[63] Iranian

Foreign Minister Velayati immediately expressed Iran's desire to end the "problems" between the two countries.[64]

The verbal cease-fire between Saudi Arabia and Iran found expression almost immediately, in the second Conference on Islamic Unity held at Tehran University from 25–26 October 1988. This forum had last met in January 1981, when it was convened during the week of the Prophet's birthday in order to refute the ruling by a leading Saudi cleric that the observance of the Prophet's birthday was incompatible with Islam. Since Shi'is and most Sunnis observe the birthday, the original aim was to cast Saudi "Wahhabism" as a deviation from ecumenical Islam. (For the first conference, see *MECS* 1981–82, pp. 290–91.) This time, however, the organizers sought to use the conference to tone down the sectarian debate, now that a truce had been implemented in the polemical war.

Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati presided over the conference, which reportedly gathered 700 *'ulama* and thinkers. In an opening speech, Rafsanjani called for the establishment of an international academy of Muslim *'ulama* to solve problems internal to Islam, especially between Sunnis and Shi'is. Rafsanjani admitted it would be difficult to create such an academy in the present circumstances, "since most Islamic countries are ruled by the forces of arrogance," but he called for an effort to find *'ulama* who were not committed politically. Finally, he proposed that the new academy be located as near as possible to Mecca.[65] This constituted a conciliatory speech, since Rafsanjani omitted the usual demand for the internationalization of the holy cities. Khameneh'i sounded a similar note in the Friday sermon immediately following the conference. "A group of mercenary pencil-pushers from Arab and non-Arab countries are sitting around waiting for certain people to say something, so that they can start a fight between Shi'is and Sunnis." Khameneh'i urged his listeners to avoid providing a pretext to those who would sow discord: "First, bear no grudges against your brother Muslims...Second, do not needle others about their sensitivities." If a sect sees that another is sensitive about something, it should not provoke them about this sensitivity." Khameneh'i then echoed Rafsanjani, asking that *'ulama* "from both sides and from various Islamic sects sit together and jointly review Islamic issues."[66]

The Gulf War cease-fire had produced a lull in the sectarian polemic that had so afflicted the Muslim world. Yet the truce was as fragile as the cease-fire itself; its continuation depended on the translation of the cease-fire into peace along the age-old frontier of Sunni-Shi'i confrontation. In the meantime, both sides kept their polemical powder dry, making no fundamental doctrinal concessions that they might later regret.

THE CHANGING FORTUNES OF SHI'I OPPOSITION

Iran's apparent defeat took the wind out of several Muslim movements supported by Iran, although they did not all pay the same price for the cease-fire. The Iraqi Shi'i opposition, which had been based largely in Tehran, was most affected by the end of hostilities. (On this opposition, see *MECS* 1983–84, pp. 170–71, 483; 1986, pp. 144–46; 1987, pp. 169–70.) The various Iraqi Shi'i opposition movements could no longer pursue their aims from Iranian soil. Rafsanjani explained that those Iraqi Shi'is who had fled to Iran:

> must consider Iran their homeland, like Iraq....If there is peace, we should first

> try to ensure the safety, according to international law, of those wishing to return to Iraq. If they are not safe in Iraq, this is their home. Our nation should receive the Iraqi brothers and sisters who are among us, as Iranians.[67]

There was a certain nobility in this plea, with its recognition that Iran owed an obligation to those Iraqi Shi'is whom Iran had led to a dead end.

But the Iraqi Shi'i opposition would not forget the cause for which it had made great sacrifices, nor lose itself in Iranian anonymity. On the contrary, its leaders remained determined to carry the struggle into the postwar phase. The Tehran-based Supreme Assembly of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SAIRI) announced that it respected Iran's decision, but would continue the "armed struggle" within Iraq, as it had done before Iran's revolution.[68] Sayyid Muhammad Taqi al-Mudarrisi, the leader of the Islamic Action Organization, also affirmed that his organization would carry on the armed struggle: "It is true that the war has ended, but our *jihad* against Saddam's regime will not end."[69] The spokesman of the Islamic Action Organization, Shaykh Muhsin al-Husayni, pointed out that the Islamic opposition to the Iraqi regime long predated the Iranian revolution. The cease-fire meant that the Iraqi people themselves would have to bear the burden of toppling the Iraqi regime, from within Iraq itself.[70]

But these groups could no longer plan or conduct the armed struggle from Iranian soil, and some began to issue their military communiqués from Beirut. The head of SAIRI, Hujjat al-Islam Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim, paid a visit to Damascus, met with Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad, and announced that his organization had drawn "closer" to the Syrian regime, in the hope of continuing the struggle. Asked whether he had discussed transferring SAIRI's operations to Syria, Baqir al-Hakim answered that Syria occupied an important geographic and strategic position *vis-à-vis* Iraq, and that Syria had been "firm" in its strategic support of the cause of Iraq's opposition.[71] During the visit, Baqir al-Hakim explored the possibility of creating a united front with other Iraqi opposition groups that were not Shi'i or Islamic in outlook.[72] Baqir al-Hakim claimed that Iran had placed no limits on SAIRI's activities following the cease-fire, and that SAIRI wished only to expand some of its activities in Syria. But neither did he rule out the possible transfer of the center of the Shi'i opposition to Syria or Lebanon.[73]

This was the extent of SAIRI's options, for the wider world was not a safe place for members of the Iraqi Shi'i opposition, given the long arm of the Iraqi regime. On 17 January, one of Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim's brothers, Sayyid Mahdi al-Hakim, was assassinated in the Khartoum Hilton, during a visit to Sudan at the invitation of Hasan al-Turabi's National Islamic Front. Mahdi al-Hakim had a long record of opposition to the Iraqi regime, but had preferred to operate free from Iranian control, and so based himself in London.[74] His fate — and the fact that even in London three attempts had been made on his life — were a solemn warning to Iraqi Shi'is who considered moving their base of operations outside the orbit of the Iranian-Syrian alliance. (For more on the Iraqi Shi'i opposition's dilemma, see chapter on Iraq.)

The Saudi Shi'i opposition, represented above all by the Organization of the Islamic Revolution in the Arabian Peninsula, also regarded the cease-fire with apprehension. An anonymous spokesman of the Shi'i opposition said that the movement was aware of certain moves towards improvement of Saudi-Iranian relations in the wake of the cease-fire, but this would not affect the activities of the

Shi'i opposition. Unlike certain other Islamic "revolutionary movements," the indigenous opposition to the Saudi regime existed before the Iranian revolution. It had deep roots in the people, it had preserved its "freedom of decision," and would continue its struggle regardless of Iran's policy. While it was not yet clear what Iran's relationship to Islamic liberation movements would be,

> we expect that the Government of the Islamic Republic will never entirely abandon the Islamic movements...it would not be wise of the leadership of the revolution to abandon its allies, who stood by it in the most difficult circumstances, just as we assume that the relationship between the leadership of the revolution and the Islamic movements has been a fundamentally strategic relationship.[75]

There could be no doubt that the truce in the war of words did not apply to the Shi'i opposition, which continued to operate clandestinely in the predominantly Shi'i eastern province of Saudi Arabia. The Saudi crackdown on the Shi'i opposition in the second half of the year culminated in 17 executions and 300 arrests. The opposition's response was to launch a campaign of assassinations against Saudi diplomats abroad: one was killed in Ankara in October, an attempt was made against another in Karachi in December, and a third was assassinated in Bangkok in January 1989.[76] (For more on the opposition activities, see chapter on Saudi Arabia.)

Iran's grip on the Saudi Shi'i opposition had always been tenuous, since Iran had wavered between confrontation and *rapprochement* in its relationship with Saudi Arabia before the Mecca incident. To make its threats against Saudi Arabia more credible it gave much attention to the statements of two new opposition groups. The Hijazi Hizballah and Islamic Jihad issued numerous statements and threats against Saudi Arabia, while professing their absolute fealty to the Imams Khomeyni and Montazeri.[77] Whether they actually existed as anything but creations of Iran was another question. Certainly the statements issued under both these names sought to capitalize on the fearsome reputations of the Lebanese Hizballah and Islamic Jihad.

In recent years, Iran had made considerable inroads among the Shi'is of Pakistan, who numbered nearly 14m. and constituted the largest Shi'i population outside Iran. There the blow of the cease-fire was compounded by the assassination on 5 August of Sayyid 'Arif Husayn al-Husayni, on his return from morning prayer in Peshawar.[78] Husayni, leader of the Movement for the Introduction of Ja'fari (Shi'i) Jurisprudence (*tehrike nifaze fiqhe Ja'fariyya*), had led the protest of Pakistan's Shi'is against subjugation to Sunni law within the framework of Pakistan's Islamization program.[79] A fervent supporter of Iran, he also had been the point man of the anti-Saudi campaign in Pakistan. The Mecca incident, in his words, was an "American intrigue": "The present war is between Islamic Iran and the United States, in which the latter exploits the Saudis."[80] On the day of his assassination he was to have addressed a conference in Lahore on the need to liberate Mecca and Medina from US-Saudi domination.[81] But Iran remained cautious in the support it extended to the Shi'i minority in Pakistan, which constituted a sectarian powder keg.

Iran also went to some pains to assure that it would not be blamed for fanning another Shi'i fire: the Shi'i Azeris of the Soviet Union. The outbreak of Azeri violence against Armenians during the year, over the future of the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh, highlighted the survival of Azeri identity. *Glasnost* had made it possible

for Azeri Shi'is to observe the rituals of *'Ashura*, which had long been banned. Now portraits of Khomeyni occasionally appeared in Azeri demonstrations in Baku. Iran was careful not to inflame this conflict, although it did seek a measure of influence among coreligionists across the border, through very subtle radio propaganda and the cultural activities of the Iranian consulate in Baku.[82] But Iranian support of Shi'is struggling against the Soviet Union remained confined to Afghanistan (see below).

IRAN'S THREATENED FOOTHOLD IN LEBANON

Nowhere had Iran succeeded in inculcating its message among non-Iranian Shi'is as in Lebanon. The Lebanese Shi'i Hizballah constituted the only mass movement inspired by Iran outside that country's frontiers. Hizballah had reached the dimensions of a serious rival to the long-established Amal movement — a rivalry that spilled over in 1988 into inter-Shi'i bloodshed that had no precedent in the history of Lebanon. The cease-fire in the Gulf, combined with the outbreak of violence and assassinations between Hizballah and the Syrian-backed Amal movement, raised new questions regarding the future of Hizballah in an Arab world no longer under the shadow of Iran's revolution. (What follows is a discussion of developments in Iran's relationship with Hizballah. For Hizballah's role in Lebanese affairs, and especially its confrontation with Amal, see chapter on Lebanon. For Iran's past role in the creation of Lebanon's Hizballah and the movement's growth, see *MECS* 1983–84, pp. 171–73; 1984–85, pp. 155–59; 1986, pp. 139–44; 1987, pp. 165–69.)

There remained a consensus in Iran that Hizballah represented a worthwhile investment. Hizballah had served Iran very well in time of war, and could do so through an uneasy peace. Its capacity for intimidation had no small deterrent value; it was arguably worth a few good divisions. Unlike the other Arab Shi'i movements sponsored by Iran, Hizballah had a territorial foothold, from which Iran could conduct a wide range of activities. Finally, Hizballah gave Iran a say in the Arab-Israeli arena that added to its international and regional weight and partly compensated for Iran's diminished stature in the Gulf. The closer Hizballah operated to the frontier of Israel, the more convincing was Iran's claim to the status of a confrontation state.

Hizballah also needed Iran. The movement's growing penetration of the south led in 1988 to a series of pitched battles with Amal, first in the south, then in the southern suburbs of Beirut. In this contest, Hizballah lost ground in the south, gained ground in Beirut, but faced the prospect of growing Syrian control over its main strongholds. Throughout the trying year of Shi'i civil war, Iran acted firmly in support of Hizballah, intervening with both Syria and Amal at crucial points. Had Iran abandoned Hizballah, the movement might well have been destroyed by its Shi'i adversary, acting in concert with Syria. But Iran sent mission after mission to Damascus and Beirut to assure that Hizballah escaped the full price of its defeats and gained the maximum benefit from its victories.

The cease-fire in the Gulf placed new strains on the relationship. Hizballah lost some of its value to Iran, and Iran suddenly seemed much more remote from Lebanon than when Iranian forces battled Iraq on Iraqi soil. The cease-fire was bound to create a morale problem in Hizballah. Unlike its Shi'i parallels in the Gulf, Hizballah had been created by Iran, and owed its continued existence to Iranian support in everything from finances to mediation with Syria. Few in the movement believed that the movement could establish an Islamic state against the will of neighboring states and

other Lebanese communities, unless Iran exercised a wide influence in the region. Hizballah's prospects were therefore tied inextricably to the regional standing of Iran. In July 1986, Husayn al-Musawi, a leading Hizballah ideologue, explained the prerequisites for Islamic government in Lebanon:

> A prerequisite for establishing Islamic government in Beirut is victory over the Zionist regime, and this victory will be achieved through reliance on God. On the other hand, as long as the banners of Islam do not wave over Baghdad and an Islamic government is not established in that land, the establishment of Islamic rule in Lebanon is not likely.[83]

This analysis remained just as sound two years later, when the cease-fire was announced. Hizballah, schooled in obedience to the Imam Khomeyni, endorsed the cease-fire between Iran and Iraq.[84] Yet the Iranian decision still had to be explained to those in Hizballah who sensed a decline in Iran's standing. An article in *al-Muntalaq*, the mouthpiece of the Hizballah-backed Union of Lebanese Muslim Students, put forward two contradictory arguments. The article suggested that even though the cease-fire spelled the end of the war, martyrdom in the path of God constituted a spiritual victory greater than the military setbacks. Had not the Imam Husayn in the seventh century achieved spiritual victory in the midst of defeat and martyrdom? This line of argument asked Hizballah to see victory not as an accumulation of military successes but as an accumulation of suffering, in the old Shi'i tradition. But Hizballah's message had always combined a demand for sacrifice with a promise of victory — in this world, not the next. And so the article's other argument suggested that the cease-fire was really an attempt to buy time and regroup, in accord with the precedents set by the Prophet Muhammad in the first wars of Islam.[85] Despite their professed desire to sacrifice themselves like the Imam Husayn, most in Hizballah really wanted the temporal triumph of the Prophet Muhammad.

There were those in Hizballah who had been indoctrinated over several years with visions of that victory, who still saw the movement's mission in eschatological terms, and who would not lower their expectations. In Hizballah, this faction was led by a number of firebrand *'ulama* of the second rank, including Ibrahim al-Amin and Hasan Nasrallah, and by Hizballah's operational commanders, al-Hajj Husayn al-Khalil, 'Abd al-Hadi Hamada, and 'Imad Mughniyya. These men sought to keep Hizballah in a state of perpetual *jihad* against all those who opposed their vision of an Islamic Lebanon. Their most powerful allies in Iran were Montazeri and Mohtashemipur, and they worked in close cooperation with the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps detachment in the Biqa' valley. It was this faction that brought Hizballah into direct conflict with Amal, and that undermined the intensive mediation efforts conducted by the Iranian Foreign Ministry, Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, and others. They also maintained a firm grip on their foreign hostages by making impossible demands for their release. For this faction, the cease-fire was a crushing blow, and they were appalled by the rumors that followed, to the effect that Iran would order all the hostages released, cut Hizballah's finances, or even drop the movement in return for normalization of relations with the West and Western investment in Iran's own reconstruction.[86]

Yet there were those in Hizballah who were emotionally prepared for the cease-fire. They had concluded some time ago that an Iranian victory was not in the cards, and so

favored the insinuation of the movement into the mainstream of Lebanese politics. To them, it was pointless for Hizballah to tilt at windmills by waging a *jihad* against the West when Iran itself had called a truce. They favored releasing the hostages, strengthening ties with Rafsanjani and Khameneh'i, and getting down to the business of building Islam in their own country. Ayatollah Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah stood at the forefront of this school, and he was reported to be at the center of a major debate on the "Lebanonization" of Hizballah. Since its inception, Hizballah had rejected the very idea of Lebanon, calling instead for the integration of Lebanon into a greater Islamic state. But as victory evaporated in the Gulf, Fadlallah reportedly urged the movement to seek a foothold in the Lebanese political system, and reach out to political leaders outside the fundamentalist camp.[87] This strategy entailed a new relationship with Iran, one based on an equal partnership rather than Lebanese subservience to Iranian dictates. "We agree with Iran," Fadlallah reiterated during the year, but

> we are not agents of Iran, as the media try to depict us. We do not owe allegiance to Iran in the full sense of the word....We are part of the world Islamic movement, whose solid base is represented by Iran. We have the freedom to have our own views on special Lebanese affairs when speaking to Iranian brothers and others.[88]

On the Iranian side, Rafsanjani was said to favor the idea of partnership, and Fadlallah reportedly enjoyed his confidence.

Fadlallah also supported Rafsanjani's desire to shut down the aggressive "exporters" of revolution in Iran: "The export of the Islamic revolution has been deformed as a result of a number of acts of violence such as kidnapping and explosions, which, it is claimed, have been provoked by Iran." In contrast, Fadlallah believed that "a gentle approach is best."[89] But by the end of the year, Rafsanjani and Fadlallah had not yet had their way, and the future course of the movement remained entangled in Iranian and Lebanese Shi'i rivalries.

Mindful that he could never command the allegiance of the zealots of Hizballah, Rafsanjani encouraged efforts by the Iranian Foreign Ministry to keep channels open to Amal. Iran's past policy had been to build its influence in Amal behind the back of Amal leader Nabih Barri. But following the first Hizballah-Amal battles in February, Barri purged his movement, most importantly by expelling a leading Amal security official, Mustafa al-Dirani, for his Iranian allegiances. On that occasion, Barri denounced Iranian "interference," and informed Iran that all its contacts with his movement had to go through him.[90] To maintain any influence in Amal, the Iranian Foreign Ministry was forced to go directly to Barri. During their mediation missions, Rafsanjani's emissaries met regularly with Barri, and sought a new understanding with the movement's leadership, offering financial support for the movement. Late in the year, the Iranian Foreign Ministry even invited him to visit Iran. Barri postponed the visit, but did not refuse the invitation.[91] Rafsanjani also continued to cultivate the head of the Supreme Islamic Shi'i Council (SISC), Shaykh Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din, who visited Tehran for talks on several occasions. Shams al-Din praised what he called the "new stage" in Iranian foreign policy, which had become "objective and realistic," unlike past policies which had "damaged the Islamic trend in Lebanon."[92] All this was met with consternation by the zealots of Hizballah, who saw

Barri as an American agent and completely rejected the authority of Shams al-Din and the SISC. When Shams al-Din visited Montazeri in Qom, he was reportedly accosted by militant Lebanese students studying in religious seminaries there, who beat his bodyguards and called out "Death to Shams al-Din!" Shams al-Din was extricated by some Revolutionary Guards.[93]

According to some reports, Iran reduced the level of its financial support for Hizballah following the Gulf cease-fire. It was impossible to know whether this was indeed the case. The truth seemed to be that Iran had decided to support existing initiatives but avoid new commitments. Iran provided Hizballah's wages and salaries; food and medical aid; pensions for families of martyrs; aid to education; the costs of armed escorts for Hizballah's leaders; support for scouting, charitable associations, and civil defense work; money for military operations; and support for Sunni groups affiliated with Hizballah (such as Shaykh Sa'id Sha'ban's Islamic Unification Movement).[94] The most important project completed during the year was a new hospital near the Beirut airport. The project had been funded by the Beirut branch of Iran's Martyrs' Foundation. In the past, the Martyrs' Foundation had reimbursed government and private hospitals for the medical expenses of Hizballah's fighters and their families, but the cost of these services was so high that it made sense to build a Hizballah-affiliated hospital.[95] The Lebanese branch of the Iranian Reconstruction Jihad was active mostly in the Biqa' valley, where it organized agricultural cooperatives, renovated houses, and built shelters, schools, and water reservoirs.[96]

By the close of the year, Hizballah was a threatened remnant of the decade of zealotry in Iranian foreign policy. In the short term, Iran remained committed to sustaining Hizballah. But the movement's long-term prospects depended upon the imponderables of the internal struggle within Iran and the goodwill of a mistrustful Syria. No longer the vanguard of Islam's strike force against the West and Israel, Hizballah seemed poised to become yet another Lebanese militia, its hands stained more with Shi'i blood than any other.

QADHDHAFI'S ISLAMIC CALL

On the sidelines of the struggle between Iranian and Saudi interpretations of the faith, Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi continued to promote his eclectic vision of Islam. That Islam was militantly anti-Western. Yet it differed from the Saudi interpretation in its antinomian bias, and was distinguished from the Iranian interpretation by its anti-clericalism. Qadhdhafi's Islam struck a responsive chord in parts of Black Africa and Southeast Asia, where Libya's missionary enterprise invested its greatest resources. Responsibility for projecting Libyan Islam beyond the country's borders was borne by the Tripoli-based World Islamic Call Society (WICS, *jam'iyyat al-da'wa al-Islamiyya al-'alamiyya*; on the past activities of the WICS, see *MECS* 1981–82, pp. 293–94; 1982–83, p. 245; 1984–85, p. 161; 1986, pp. 146–48; 1987, pp. 161–62).

The WICS achieved its aims first of all through the training and sponsorship of Muslim missionaries. In the 1987–88 academic year, the WICS's missionary college in Tripoli enrolled 142 students; a reunion of graduates in August gathered 228 missionaries from 29 countries.[97] A Damascus branch of the college enrolled 700 students,[98] and operated under the auspices of the mufti of Syria, Shaykh Ahmad Kiftaru, who visited Libya under WICS auspices in August.[99] The WICS also

maintained offices in various cities around the world, which identified worthy grantees and administered Libyan funds to Islamic centers and individuals. These offices not only spread the message of Libyan Islam, but also held annual commemorations of the April 1986 US bombing of Libya.[100] The office in Harari, Zimbabwe, was especially active in the affairs of the local Muslim community, and represented perhaps the most important outpost of the WICS in Black Africa.[101] Something of its role could be learned from a testimonial written by a 28-year-old convert to Islam from Zimbabwe. The WICS not only invited him to an Islamic conference in Libya, but also sent him on the pilgrimage to Mecca.[102] Another technique of influence was the traveling medical "caravan," drawing on the precedent established by Christian missionaries in Black Africa. According to the description of one such caravan, doctors worked alongside professional Muslim missionaries, who established contact with local Islamic societies in host countries. At the end of their visits, the caravans donated their equipment and supplies to local hospitals.[103]

Finally, there were the WICS's own conferences. In this year of sectarian tension, the WICS convened a conference on the subject from 11-13 May in Tripoli; its resolutions called on all Muslims to set aside differences of sect and school.[104] The event went unnoticed in the wider Muslim world. The seventh session of the WICS's International Council met in San'a from 29 October-2 November.[105] A WICS-sponsored conference of Libyan-backed Muslim activists met in Malta from 15–20 November to discuss the cultural defense of Islam against the intellectual attacks of Christian missionaries, Orientalists, and Zionists. The gathering resolved to establish a new Center for Study of the Islamic World (*markaz dirasat al-'alam al-Islami*) in Tripoli, which would constitute the academic arm of the WICS.[106] These and the other activities of the WICS enjoyed the continuing financial support of the Libyan regime. Qadhdhafi called for opening up new branches of the WICS, declaring that Libya "will contribute from its state budget to the building and setting up of these branches in the Islamic world."[107] During the year the WICS became an endowed institution, when the profits of a new five-tower office and conference complex in Tripoli were consecrated to its use.[108]

The cooperation between the WICS and Syria indicated that the WICS was meant to do more than spread Islam to Africans or compete with missionary organizations sponsored by other states. Just as the MWL worked to combat alleged Shi'i distortions of Islam, the WICS battled the ideas of the Muslim Brethren, who constituted a domestic threat to Libya and Syria.[109] Qadhdhafi, in his August address to the alumni of the WICS missionary college, declared that the Muslim Brethren and similar movements had "harmed Islam as much as Western Christian colonialism," and were "a discredit to Islam." The Brethren conspired with the US, which financed the Brethren to fight other Muslims; it was a "satanic and Zionist group." Had the Muslim Brethren in Syria turned their "crimes" into a *jihad* against Israel, "the Golan would probably be free. But they did not fire a single bullet in the direction of the Golan or Palestine. They blew up houses, bridges, and factories; they killed [Syrian] military cadets [in Aleppo in 1979]; they killed military commanders."[110] In another tirade against the Muslim Brethren (and the Islamic Liberation Party), Qadhdhafi declared that the name of the Muslim Brethren was synonymous with "agents of America....An American officer in the American intelligence was the leader of the Libyan Muslim Brethren. What was their outcome? We slaughter them like sheep and

goats without regret."[111] Islam as propagated by the WICS on behalf of Libya and Syria represented the militant Arab nationalist response to the challenge of the Muslim Brethren, continuing (yet distorting) the tradition of Nasir's Egypt that Qadhdhafi held so dear. The offensive of the WICS served as a reminder that while the threat of transnational Shi'ism receded, the challenge of transnational Sunni militancy remained.

THE TRANSNATIONAL MUSLIM BRETHREN

Despite the long-standing presence of the Muslim Brethren in most countries of the Middle East, little was known about the network that linked them together. In some countries, the Muslim Brethren operated openly; in others, they functioned clandestinely. To protect those who did operate secretly, the visible Muslim Brethren rarely spoke about the support they offered to their covert colleagues, and the subject became one of much speculation.

Certainly the Muslim Brethren had a sense that they belonged to a worldwide movement. When the Palestinian Muslim Brethren in Gaza published their "covenant" in August, its second article declared it "a branch of the branches of the Muslim Brethren in Palestine. The Muslim Brethren movement is an international organization [*tanzim 'alami*], and is the largest of the Islamic movements of modern times."[112] There clearly existed a network of informal ties between the leaders of these branches, maintained at conferences held around the Muslim world (see *MECS* 1983–84, p. 174; 1986, p. 146; 1987, pp. 160–61). The February conference on Islamic unity that met in Islamabad (see above) served just this purpose. But the question remained: Were the Muslim Brethren organized on a more formal basis?

New evidence that such a framework might exist appeared in a rare interview given by 'Adnan Sa'd al-Din, who had been the leader of the Syrian Muslim Brethren at the time of the uprising against the Syrian regime in Hamah in 1982 (see *MECS* 1981–82, pp. 847–55). In the interview, Sa'd al-Din revealed that the Muslim Brethren were governed loosely by a higher "command" (*qiyada*) or "council" (*shura*) of the "international organization" (*tanzim 'alami*), whose members "would not want me to mention their names." Asked why so much secrecy surrounded the higher command, Sa'd al-Din replied that "the Brethren movement has always been persecuted in Arab lands....The Brethren do not believe in secret action, which they completely reject, but the movement unfortunately is sometimes forced to resort to secret action, not by choice."[113]

Sa'd al-Din, long a leading figure in the world of Muslim Brethren activism, made this claim because of his differences with the higher command, which no longer recognized him as leader of the Syrian Brethren.[114] But the Egyptian general guide of the Muslim Brethren, Muhammad Hamid Abu al-Nasr, continued to maintain that "there is no official organization, but rather a harmony of feelings and agreement on serving the Islamic idea. It is simply a spiritual bond that links the activities in the Arab and Islamic states in the service of Islam and of the Arabs."[115] Yet it seemed probable that the informal relationships between the parts of the movement were undergoing a process of institutionalization.

ISLAM FOR AFGHANISTAN AND PALESTINE

While the war within Islam came to a merciful halt during the year, the *jihad* against non-Muslim occupiers made significant gains on two fronts and excited the imagination of Muslim activists. In Afghanistan, a Muslim resistance registered a victory in compelling the Soviet Union to cut losses and withdraw its forces from what had become a deadly adventure. The victory of the Afghan *mujahidun* against a world power revalidated fundamentalist conviction in the wider Muslim world, especially among Sunnis. In the West Bank and Gaza, the uprising against Israel partially employed the rhetoric of a Muslim struggle against a non-Muslim oppressor. Muslim observers who were inclined to do so tagged the uprising an Islamic *intifada*, and cited the resort to an Islamic interpretation of the conflict by young activists in Muslim movements outside the control of the PLO. While the debate in Iran raised questions about the value of Islam as the foundation of the state, there could be no doubt about the continuing power of Islam to mobilize masses against non-Muslims perceived as occupiers and oppressors.

THE AFGHAN *JIHAD* AND THE MUSLIM WORLD

Saudi Arabia made the heaviest material and political investment of all the Middle Eastern parties interested in the Afghan war. The Saudis hoped to mold the Islam of the Afghan resistance in their own image, through education and financial support. The MWL had an office in Peshawar, Pakistan, the logistical base of the Sunni Afghan resistance. This office opened 150 Qur'an study centers in Afghan refugee camps, and 85 Islamic schools inside Afghanistan itself.[116] This complemented the humanitarian aid offered by Saudi Arabia to the Pakistan-based Afghan resistance, which totaled SR445m. at the start of 1988.[117] Relief aid and education constituted the overt dimension of Saudi involvement in the war waged by the Sunni *mujahidun* against the Soviet-backed regime in Kabul, but many other Saudi agencies were involved in the Afghan arena. There were also several hundred Arab volunteers in the ranks of the Afghan *mujahidun*. Most of these were Egyptians, Sudanese, and Saudis, sent by branches of the Muslim Brethren. In Afghanistan they tended to join the *Ittihade Islami* of the Saudi-backed 'Abd Rabb Rasul Sayyaf, or the *Hizbe Islami* of Gulbuddin Hikmatyar.[118] Saudi Arabia's presence in the refugee camps and its financial support for the armed struggle were intended to win the Saudis influence over a new Afghan regime whenever it emerged.

In the field of diplomacy, the Saudis also employed Muslim clients to mediate between the Soviet Union and the *mujahidun*. At one point this role was played by Ma'ruf al-Duwalibi, Saudi protégé and international Muslim activist, who met with leading Soviet officials. In Moscow, he proposed solutions undoubtedly coordinated with Saudi Arabia, and declared himself "satisfied with the way [the Soviets] both listened and talked to us."[119]

This was all the more important given Iran's support of the Shi'i component of the Afghan resistance. Iran's setback in the Gulf did not diminish its interest in the creation of a friendly successor regime in Afghanistan, and in a solution for the 1.5m. Afghan refugees in Iran. Iran invested much in the support and training of the eight Afghan factions based in Iran, most of which were Shi'i in composition. One of the most important of these groups, *Nasr*, best expressed the antagonistic position of the

Iran-based resistance toward the US-Soviet Geneva accords for Soviet withdrawal: "Despite commotion over peace, reconciliation, and coalition rule, the armed struggle will continue."[120] A spokesman for *Nasr* warned the Soviet Union that "the heroic people of Afghanistan will never compromise and are determined to establish an Islamic republic in Afghanistan."[121]

But unlike the Shi'is of Lebanon or Iraq, the Afghan Shi'is were in a clear minority, and Iran therefore sought a dialogue with the Peshawar-based Sunni resistance. This had been impossible so long as the rival coalitions were mobilized in the Mecca controversy. At the height of the controversy, the Peshawar-based groups supported by Saudi Arabia conducted a campaign to discredit the Iran-based coalition, declaring that its leader, Sayyid Husayn 'Alemi, was born not in Afghanistan but in Iranian Khorasan.[122] But as memories of Mecca receded, Iran opened a dialogue with the Peshawar-based Burhanuddin Rabbani, the leader of the *Jami'ate Islami*, which had large numbers of resistance fighters in Herat and the north. During a visit to Iran, he allegedly promised Iran that Afghan Shi'is would receive a fair share in the distribution of power in a new coalition, in return for Iranian assistance to the Peshawar-based groups.[123] Saudi Arabia may not have been pleased by the opening of the dialogue, and pro-Saudi sources claimed that Rabbani returned empty-handed.[124] Later (in 1989) it would become clear that the initiative failed, when the provisional government elected by the *shura* of the Peshawar-based groups did not include the Iran-based resistance. (For other aspects of these issues, see chapter on the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan).

CLAIMING THE ISLAMIC *INTIFADA*

Nothing so electrified the world of Islamic activism as the role played by Islam in the Palestinian *intifada*.The hegemony within Palestinian nationalism of the PLO and the left had created the impression that the resurgence of Islam passed over Palestine. Yet the events of the *intifada* revealed the depth of an Islamic current that ran beneath Palestinian nationalism, sometimes complementing and sometimes contradicting the strategies of the PLO. (For the role of Islam in the *intifada*, see chapter on the West Bank and Gaza Strip.)[125]

As the role of Islam received more attention, the various outside contestants to Islamic primacy sought to exercise influence over this emerging Islamic movement, and claim it as their own. The strongest claim belonged to the Muslim Brethren, who had a long history of activism in the West Bank and Gaza.[126] There the movement sometimes went under the name of the Islamic Resistance Movement (*harakat al-muqawama al-Islamiyya*; widely known by its acronym, Hamas). PLO chairman Yasir 'Arafat recognized the importance of the Muslim Brethren when he visited the general guide of the Egyptian Muslim Brethren, Muhammad Hamid Abu al-Nasr, in November. He was rewarded with a statement by Abu al-Nasr that endorsed the declaration of Palestinian independence made at the Algiers Palestine National Council (PNC). But the statement also affirmed the Palestinian right to establish its state and government over all the land of Palestine. While endorsing the PLO's readiness to enter an international conference on the basis of UN Resolutions 181, 242, and 338, Abu al-Nasr declared that the UN never had the right to alienate so much as a grain of Palestinian soil to the "Zionist entity."[127] In this respect, the Muslim Brethren movement generally adopted the line followed by Hamas: limited

endorsement of the PLO's diplomatic tactics, combined with a principled rejection of a two-state solution. (In its own communication to the Algiers PNC, Hamas had reiterated the religious obligation to liberate all Palestine, while agreeing to the establishment of a Palestinian state on any part of Palestine that might be liberated.)[128]

Saudi Arabia also exercised some indirect influence through the Muslim Brethren, but it preferred to open its own channels to the Palestinian Islamic establishment. It did so through the MWL, which had forged ties with the Islamic establishment in Jerusalem even before the *intifada*. The mufti of Jerusalem and head of the Supreme Muslim Council, Shaykh Sa'd al-Din al-'Alami, was a member of the MWL's Supreme World Council of Mosques, and met with MWL secretary-general 'Abdallah 'Umar Nasif during a visit to Mecca in April.[129] Israeli sources noted the influx of considerable sums of MWL money, not only to the West Bank and East Jerusalem, but to Muslim religious institutions in Israel itself. A Saudi opposition source even claimed that Nasif planned to visit the West Bank,[130] but the visit did not take place. The Islamic aspect of the *intifada* also prompted persons in the Saudi religious establishment to call for the Islamization of the Palestinian struggle against Israel. According to Nasif and Shaykh 'Abd al-'Aziz Ibn Baz, mufti of the kingdom, the Palestinian shift from an ideology of liberation to one of *jihad* constituted the secret of the *intifada*'s success. Islam, not Arabism, offered the firm base upon which to build the struggle for Palestine.[131] By these declarations, the Saudi religious establishment clearly wished to gain some influence over the emerging Palestinian Islamic movement. But by its ties with the established 'Alami, the MWL indicated the usual Saudi preference for a conservative and institutionalized brand of Islam. 'Alami, however, had no intention of limiting his contacts to Saudi Arabia. In June, he paid his first visit to Tripoli, Libya, where he thanked Libya's WICS for its "generous support."[132]

Iran also claimed a corner of the *intifada*, for having inspired the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. This small group, which thrived principally in Gaza, viewed Khomeyni as the harbinger of the *jihad* for the liberation of Palestine. Its spiritual leader, Shaykh 'Abd al-'Aziz 'Uda, was deported in April to Lebanon. He then gave a news conference at the Iranian embassy in Beirut, where he declared that "the Islamic victory in Iran restored trust and faith to the souls of Muslims, and played a role in driving the Islamic revival forward...the *intifada* is an echo of the victories of the Muslims in Lebanon and Iran."[133] Once the leaders of the movement arrived in Lebanon, they came under the wing of Hizballah. When Hizballah convened the First World Conference in Support of the Islamic *Intifada* in Occupied Palestine, from 20–21 December in Beirut, the event was attended by another expelled leader of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Shaykh Ahmad Muhanna. Also in attendance were Abu Musa and Ahmad Jibril, the ubiquitous Shaykh Sa'id Sha'ban, Hizballah spokesman Sayyid Ibrahim al-Amin, Montazeri's Beirut representative Shaykh Muhammad Isma'il Khaliq, and Hizballah clerics Shaykh Na'im Qasim and Shaykh Hasan Tarad.[134] Iran and Hizballah made much of the Islamic aspect of the *intifada*, claiming that the West had sought to conceal this face of the uprising. But Iran had hardly any contact with the Islamic forces inside Palestine, and spokesmen of the Muslim Brethren-affiliated Hamas were at pains to distance themselves from Iran.

The Gulf cease-fire, the "Islamic *intifada*," and the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan were interpreted in many fundamentalist publications as evidence for the end of internal strife and the impending triumph of Islam over its perceived enemies.

But by the end of the year, Muslims had become preoccupied not by invading armies or foreign armadas, but by a book: Salman Rushdie's novel, *The Satanic Verses*. The first Muslim condemnations of the book appeared in the latter half of 1988,[135] although the storm did not break until 1989. (The causes and effects of the Rushdie affair will be assessed in *MECS* 1989.) Like the perceived desecration of Mecca in 1987, the perceived defamation of the Prophet Muhammad in Rushdie's book did even more than Afghanistan or Palestine to stir the Muslim world — and divide it once again.

NOTES

For the place and frequency of publications cited here, and for the full names of the publication, news agency, radio station, or monitoring service where an abbreviation is used, please see "List of Sources." Only in the case of more than one publication bearing the same name is the place of publication noted here. The publication *al-'Alam* cited here is the London weekly.

1. See also Martin Kramer, "Tragedy in Mecca," *Orbis: A Journal of World Affairs*, Vol. 32, No. 2 (Spring 1988), pp. 231–47; *idem*, "La Mecque: la controverse du pèlerinage," *Maghreb-Machrek*, No. 122 (October-November-December 1988), pp. 38–52; and the (pro-Saudi) summary of the events of each pilgrimage in *al-Siyasa*, Kuwait, 26 May 1988.
2. This account relies on *al-'Alam*, 27 February; IRNA, 19 February — DR, 19 February; *KI*, 20 February 1988.
3. Text of Fahd's message, *al-Sharq al-Awsat*, 17 February 1988.
4. Criticisms of the conference by Kalim Siddiqui, *Crescent International*, 16-31 May 1988.
5. E.g., *al-Thawra al-Islamiyya*, April 1988.
6. Khameneh'i's speech, *Kayhan al-'Arabi*, 2 February; IRNA, 1 February — DR, 2 February; Rafsanjani's speech, IRNA, 4 February — DR, 5 February; report of conference, *Kayhan al-'Arabi*, 4, 6 February; *KI*, 6 February; interviews with some conference participants, *Kayhan al-'Arabi*, 27 February 1988.
7. Some of these are described in *Kayhan al-'Arabi*, 16 July 1988. For an exhaustive catalogue of participants in various Islamic conferences sponsored by Iran during 1988, see Xavier Raufer (ed.), "Iran Islamique: L'Appareil mondial," *Notes et Etudes de l'Institut de Criminologie de Paris*, No. 9, March 1989.
8. Two books have recently appeared on the MWL. See Reinhard Schulze, *Islamischer Internationalismus im 20. Jahrhundert. Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der Islamischen Weltliga (Mekka)* (Leiden: Brill, 1988); and R. M. Sharipova, *Panislamizm syegodnya. Idyeologiya i praktika Ligi Islamskogo Mira* (Moscow: Nauka Press, 1986).
9. See chapters on Egypt in *MECS* 1987 and this volume; new details from MENA, 15 June — DR, 16 June; interview with "official spokesman" of the group, *al-Thawra al-Islamiyya*, August 1988.
10. For the first eight conferences of the Academy, see J. Jomier, "Les congrès de l'Académie des Recherches Islamiques dépendant de l'Azhar," *Mélanges de l'Institut Dominicain des Études Orientales du Caire*, Vol. 14 (1980), pp. 95–148. The ninth conference is described in *MECS* 1982–83, p. 248. I omitted an account in *MECS* of the tenth conference, which met in Cairo from 1–7 November 1985.
11. Mubarak's speech, R. Cairo, 5 March — DR, 8 March 1988.
12. Text of resolutions, *Majallat al-Azhar*, April; *Akhbar al-'Alam al-Islami*, 14 March 1988; special annex to *al-Tadamun al-Islami*, Ramadan 1408.
13. Text of his paper, *al-Fikr al-Islami*, April 1988.
14. Text of constitution, *Majallat al-Azhar*, October-November 1988.
15. A brief account of the ICO's structure, organization, and subsidiary bodies is provided by *al-Dustur*, Amman, 9 March 1988.
16. *JT*, 22 March 1988.
17. Reports on summit initiative, *al-Jumhuriyya*, Cairo, 2 February (citing *al-Ra'y al-'Amm*); *Iqra*, 11 February 1988.

18. R. Amman, 22 March — DR, 23 March 1988.
19. Amman TV, 21 March — DR, 23 March 1988.
20. Sa'ud al-Faysal's speech, SPA, 23 March — DR, 25 March 1988.
21. Text of speech by Iranian representative, *Kayhan al-'Arabi,* 9 April 1988.
22. AFP, 24 March — DR, 24 March 1988.
23. Final resolutions, *al-Dustur,* Amman, 26 March 1988.
24. Syrian Foreign Minister Faruq al-Shar', quoted by R. Damascus, 25 March — DR, 29 March 1988.
25. *ME,* August 1988.
26. *Al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya,* 8 June 1988.
27. Sa'ud al-Faysal's speech, SPA, 23 March — DR, 25 March 1988.
28. *Al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya,* 20 January 1988.
29. Biographical details provided by Hanspeter Mattes, "Hamid Algabid," *Orient,* Vol. 29, No. 3 (September 1988), pp. 337–39.
30. *ME,* December 1988.
31. *JT,* 22 March 1988.
32. Donations acknowledged in conference resolutions, *al-Dustur,* Amman, 26 March 1988.
33. "Responsible source" in Saudi Ministry of Pilgrimage Affairs and Religious Endowments, R. Riyadh, 29 February — DR, 1 March 1988.
34. Comment by Na'if, SPA, 12 April — DR, 13 April 1988.
35. R. Tehran, 11 April — DR, 12 April; *FT, IHT,* 12 April 1988.
36. Interview with Na'if, *al-Siyasa,* Kuwait, 2 May; accounts of the meetings in interview with head of Iranian delegation, R. Tehran, 19 April — DR, 20 April; in round table devoted to subject, Tehran TV, 16 June — DR, 21 June; Saudi version in SPA, 19 April — DR, 20 April; interview with Na'if, *al-Siyasa,* Kuwait, 2 May 1988.
37. Tehran TV, 16 June — DR, 21 June 1988.
38. Severing of relations analyzed in *Kayhan al-'Arabi,* 30 April; *al-Thawra al-Islamiyya,* June 1988.
39. Saudi Council of Ministers' statement, SPA, 28 June — DR, 30 June 1988.
40. Mehdi Karrubi, Tehran TV, 16 June — DR, 21 June 1988.
41. Message of Khomeyni on occasion of the Mecca "massacre" and Iran's acceptance of UN Resolution 598, R. Tehran, 20 July — DR, 21 July; *Kayhan al-'Arabi,* 23 July (special issue); *al-Hilal al-Duwali,* 16–31 August 1988. Abu Sufyan was a member of the Prophet Muhammad's tribe who had originally opposed Muhammad; his son, Yazid, was responsible for the killing of the Imam Husayn; and another son, Mu'awiya, founded the Umayyad dynasty. The family and the dynasty are deemed usurpers in the Shi'i reading of early Islamic history.
42. *Al-Siyasa,* Kuwait, 18 June; *ST,* 17 July 1988.
43. R. Tehran in Turkish, 5 May — DR, 11 May 1988.
44. R. Tehran in Arabic, 23 July — DR, 26 July 1988.
45. *Al-Yawm,* 22 July 1988.
46. IRNA, 29 August — DR, 31 August 1988.
47. IRNA, 22 May — DR, 25 May; Saudi security measures detailed in *al-'Alam,* 6 August 1988.
48. On the drop in Lebanese visas, see *Kayhan al-'Arabi,* 14 July; IRNA, 29 June — DR, 30 June; demonstrations by Lebanese Shi'is against the cut, *Kayhan al-'Arabi,* 16 July 1988.
49. SPA, 25 July — DR, 25 July 1988.
50. *FR,* 26 January 1989.
51. *Kayhan,* Tehran, *Ettela'at,* 7 June 1988.
52. Text of letter, *Kayhan,* London, 6 October; discussed in *Le Monde,* 8 October 1988. The authenticity of the letter cannot be guaranteed.
53. For this evidence, see *ST,* 17 April; *ME,* May 1988.
54. *Al-Qabas,* 12 April 1988.
55. Rafsanjani's sermon, R. Tehran, 19 August — DR, 22 August 1988.
56. Fouad Ajami, "Iran: The Impossible Revolution," *Foreign Affairs,* Vol. 67, No. 2 (Winter 1988–89), p. 136.

57. Interview with Sha'ban, *Kayhan al-'Arabi*, 30 July 1988. The specific instance he refers to is that of the Tunisian Islamic movement.
58. Text of Fahd speech, *al-Fikr al-Islami*, November 1988.
59. Text of final statement, SPA, 12 October — DR, 19 October; *al-Fikr al-Islami*, November 1988.
60. King Fahd's speech, *al-Fikr al-Islami*, November 1988.
61. R. Tehran, 13 October — DR, 14 October 1988.
62. Saudi Shi'i opposition sources also took issue with Fahd; see *al-Thawra al-Islamiyya*, November 1988.
63. SPA, 20 October — DR, 24 October 1988.
64. IRNA, 23 October — DR, 24 October 1988.
65. IRNA, 25 October — DR, 26 October; *Kayhan al-'Arabi*, 26 October 1988.
66. Khameneh'i's sermon, R. Tehran, 28 October — DR, 31 October 1988.
67. Rafsanjani's prayer sermon, R. Tehran, 19 August — DR, 22 August 1988.
68. Text of SAIRI statement, *Kayhan al-'Arabi*, 23 July 1988.
69. *Al-Thawra al-Islamiyya*, October 1988.
70. Interview in *al-Thawra al-Islamiyya*, August 1988.
71. *KI*, 19 November; text of Baqir al-Hakim's interview, *Kayhan al-'Arabi*, 24 November 1988.
72. Report on negotiations for a "covenant of joint action," *al-Thawra al-Islamiyya*, December 1988.
73. Interview with Baqir al-Hakim, *Kayhan al-'Arabi*, 26 November1988.
74. Obituary of Mahdi al-Hakim, *KI*, 6 February; comments by various opposition figures on his work, *Kayhan al-'Arabi*, 12 March 1988.
75. *Al-Thawra al-Islamiyya*, September 1988.
76. *FR*, 12 January 1989.
77. Texts of statements by Hizballah of Hijaz, 23 June — DR, 24 June; 5 September — DR, 7 September; AFP, 5 October — DR, 6 October; statement by Islamic Jihad of the Hijaz, *Kayhan al-'Arabi*, 18 July 1988.
78. Obituary, *KI*, 13 August; various Shi'i statements on assassination, *Kayhan al-'Arabi*, 13 August 1988.
79. See Munir Ahmed, "The Shi'is of Pakistan," in Martin Kramer (ed.), *Shi'ism, Resistance, and Revolution* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987), pp. 282–84.
80. Maleeha Lodhi, "Pakistan's Shia movement: an interview with Arif Hussaini," *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 10, No. 2 (April 1988), pp. 806–17.
81. R. Tehran, 21 July — DR, 22 July; *KI*, 13 August 1988.
82. *FR*, 19 January 1989.
83. Interview with Husayn al-Musawi, *Kayhan*, Tehran, 27 July 1986.
84. Text of Hizballah statement on Iran's acceptance of UN Resolution 598, *al-Nahar*, Beirut, 22 July 1988.
85. *Al-Muntalaq*, September 1988.
86. See, for example, the report on the supposed disbanding of Islamic Jihad, *al-Shira'*, 8 August; the reported cut in funds to Hizballah from $11m. to $1m. a month, *al-Shira'*, 19 September 1988.
87. *Al-Shira'*, 19 September 1988.
88. Interview with Fadlallah, R. Monte Carlo, 13 May — DR, 20 May 1988.
89. Interview with Fadlallah, *Cumhuriyet*, 19 August — DR, 25 August 1988.
90. AFP, 18 March — DR, 21 March; discussion of Dirani's defection, *JP*, 2 March 1988.
91. *Al-Shira'*, 5 December; see also Voice of Free Lebanon, 31 August — DR, 31 August 1988.
92. Interview with Shams al-Din, *Amal*, 2 December 1988.
93. *Al-Shira'*, 26 December 1988.
94. These categories, which appear to be accurate, are listed by *al-Tadamun*, 19 March — DR, 25 March 1988. The figures given for each category total about $16m. a month (not including emergency reserve funds). Israeli officials placed Iran's investment in Hizballah at about $100m. a year, and noted that Western diplomatic sources estimated the support at even higher levels; see interview with Uri Lubrani, *Ha'aretz*, 3 June 1988.

95. Inauguration of hospital, *al-Nahar*, Beirut, 31 October; hospital described, *al-'Alam*, 19 November 1988.
96. Description of activities, *al-'Ahd*, 18 November 1988.
97. *Al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya*, 17 August 1988.
98. *Al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya*, 8 June 1988.
99. *Al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya*, 31 August 1988.
100. *Al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya*, 27 April 1988.
101. On the assistance to Muslim institutions in Zimbabwe, see *al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya*, 11 May 1988.
102. *Al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya*, 6 January 1988.
103. Description of a caravan in Botswana, *al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya*, 6 January 1988.
104. Resolutions of conference, *al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya*, 25 May 1988.
105. Details on meeting, *al-Fikr al-Islami*, December; *al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya*, 9 November 1988.
106. Report on conference, *al-'Alam*, 10 December 1988.
107. Qadhdhafi's speech, Tripoli TV, 21 August — DR, 23 August 1988.
108. Description of complex, *al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya*, 14 September1988.
109. On this opposition, see George Joffee, "Islamic Opposition in Libya," *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 10, No. 2 (April 1988), pp. 615–31.
110. Text of Qadhdhafi's speech, Tripoli TV, 21 August — DR, 23 August; *al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya*, 31 August 1988.
111. Qadhdhafi speech to teachers, Tripoli TV, 28 January — DR, 30 January 1988.
112. *Mithaq Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya — Filastin*, pamphlet dated 18 August 1988.
113. *Al-Watan al-'Arabi*, 3 June 1988. On Sa'd al-Din, see Thomas Mayer, "The Islamic Opposition in Syria, 1961–1982," *Orient*, Vol. 24, No. 4 (December 1983), pp. 589–609.
114. The revelations came in the context of an internal struggle among the Syrian Muslim Brethren. Since Hamah, the Syrian Brethren had split into several factions, and their leadership had become a hotly contested issue. Sa'd al-Din led a faction based in Iraq, which called for the continuation of armed struggle against the Syrian regime. Shaykh 'Abd al-Fattah Abu Ghudda led another faction based in Saudi Arabia, whose representatives had met with agents of the Syrian regime to seek some compromise. Both leaders claimed the title of general supervisor (*muraqib 'amm*) of the Syrian Brethren. Sa'd al-Din complained that the higher command, seeing the division in the ranks of the Syrian Brethren, had intervened in the affairs of the Syrian branch to declare Abu Ghudda the general supervisor. This intervention, said Sa'd al-Din, was illegal according to the constitution of the Syrian Brethren, and he continued to claim the title of general supervisor. For a summary of the divisions among the Syrian Brethren, see *ME*, April; on Abu Ghudda's latest negotiations with the regime, see *al-Muharrir*, 16 January 1988.
115. Hamid Abu al-Nasr's interview, *al-Sharq al-Awsat*, 11 January — DR, 15 January 1988.
116. *Akhbar al-'Alam al-Islami*, 21 March 1988.
117. *Akhbar al-'Alam al-Islami*, 18 January; discussion of the various Islamic aid agencies working among Afghan refugees, *al-Da'wa*, 4 January 1988.
118. Discussion of the Arabs in the resistance, AFP, 21 February — DR, 23 February; *al-Jihad*, Peshawar, May 1988.
119. Interview with Ma'ruf al-Duwalibi, *al-Sharq al-Awsat*, 5 January — DR, 13 January 1988.
120. Declaration by *Nasr*, R. Tehran, 24 June — DR, 24 June 1988.
121. Quoted by IRNA, 30 January — DR, 2 February 1988.
122. *Al-Dustur*, London, 25 January 1988.
123. *FR*, 5 January 1989.
124. *Al-Majalla*, 14 June 1988.
125. See also Jean-François Legrain, "Les islamistes palestiniens à l'épreuve du soulèvement," *Maghreb-Machrek*, No. 121 (July-August-September 1988), pp. 5–42.
126. On this movement, see Mohammed K. Shadid, "The Muslim Brotherhood Movement in the West Bank and Gaza," *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 10, No. 2 (April 1988), pp. 658–82.
127. Text of statement, *al-Ghuraba*, Leeds, December 1988.
128. Text in *al-Ghuraba*, December 1988.
129. Reported in *Akhbar al-'Alam al-Islami*, 18 April 1988.
130. *Al-Thawra al-Islamiyya*, January 1988.

131. *Akhbar al-'Alam al-Islami,* 5 January 1989.
132. *Al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya,* 6 July 1988.
133. *Kayhan al-'Arabi,* 16 April; *al-Thawra al-Islamiyya,* May 1988.
134. Account of conference, *al-'Alam,* 7 January 1989.
135. See *Impact International,* 28 October-10 November (cover story); *al-Ghuraba,* November 1988.